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Abstract  cies, including soil conservation policies,  represent
The  1990  Farm  Bill  contains  several  measures  significant  costs to consumers  and tax-payers,  soil
concerning  soil  erosion  caused  by  U.S.  farmers,  conservation  is  likely  to  be  influenced  by public
Data from a nationwide survey of people concerning  input in the decision-making  process.  Therefore,  it
their attitudes toward agriculture were used to exam-  isusefultogaugethepublic's  willingnesstosupport
ine the structure of respondents' preferences for gov-  soil  erosion  control  programs.  This  support  will
ernment  support-policies  to  combat  soil  erosion.  depend, in part, on the public's awareness and per-
Estimates of the  influence of socio-economic  and  ceptions of an erosion problem.  Previous research
demographic  variables  on  policy preferences  were  has concentrated on the farmer's decision on adop-
computed using a multiple-indicator model.  Results  tion of soil conservation practices (Earle et al.; Ervin
show more support for the regulation of soil erosion,  and Ervin; Lynne et al.; Norris and Batie). Empirical
including laws and fines, than for government finan-  analyses of citizen perceptions of the erosion prob-
cialsupport.  lem  and  preferences  for  conservation  programs,
however,  are  few.  The  aim  of this  study  was  to
Key words:  soil erosion, preferences measurement,  estimate the determinants  of citizen perceptions of
linear structural relationship  the erosion problem and preferences for soil erosion
(LISREL) model, latent variables  control  policies,  including  governmental  payment
0Ax-  eunefheriamvmn  support.
One consequence of the environmental movement  Perceptions and preferences cannot be observed or
has been an increased concern  about the impact of  directly measured.  Such concepts are often referred
agriculture on water quality and soil resources.  Soil  to as latent variables;  they are essentially hypotheti-
conservation  programs  were  an  important part  of  cal constructs to conceptualize intangible elements
both the 1985 and 1990 farm bills. The U.S. govern-  of the domain studied by a particular science (Muel-
ment has increased its spending  and involvement  in  ler).  Constructs were needed to measure perceptions
soil conservation programs to mitigate the increasing  and preferences.  Responses to a single question will
economic and social costs of erosion.  One estimate  not be appropriate for deriving  such constructs  be-
puts the annual direct offsite damage from soil ero-  cause of the measurement  problem associated with
sion at between $4 and $15 billion (Ribaudo).  Con-  survey data  (Kalton and Schuman).  Most previous
servation  policies  have  consisted  of  providing  empirical  analysis  of public  preferences,  however,
farmers  with technical  and monetary  incentives  to  were based on responses to a single question (Ferris
invest in soil conservation practices.  Under the Con-  1983,  1985; Gramlich  and Rubinfeld;  Hewitt;  and
servation  Reserve  Program  for  example,  farmers  Schokkaert).  In this study,  observed  responses to
must  retire  land  from production  for  ten years  in  multiple questions were modeled as imperfect  indi-
return  for annual  payments from the U.S.  Depart-  cators of the true constructs (perception of soil ero-
ment of Agriculture.  Because of this program, ex-  sion  and  preferences  for  soil  erosion  control
penditures by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for  policies).  Hopefully,  this approach will reduce the
erosion control have increased from $379 million in  measurement problem.  The underlying constructs
1986 to more than $1.1  billion (1982 dollars) in 1987  are then related to the observed socioeconomic  and
(Nielsen et al.).  demographic  characteristics of the respondents.
This increasing  governmental involvement is due
in part to changing public attitudes toward environ-  DATA AND VARIABLES
mental  issues.  Public participation  in the environ-  The analysis in this paper is based on data from a
mental decision-making process is likely to increase  nationwide survey conducted in 1986 by the S-198
in the future  (Havlicek).  Because agricultural  poli-  Regional Research Project, "Socioeconomic Dimen-
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73sions of Agricultural Change, Natural Resource Use  "strongly  agree,"  one  to  "agree,"  two  to  "unde-
and Agricultural  Structure."  The survey's goal was  cided,"  three  to  "disagree,"  and  four to  "strongly
to determine public views of changes in the structure  disagree" for the first five statements.  For the sixth
of U.S. agriculture.  After pretesting, questionnaires  statement,  the  assigned  values  ranged  from  zero
were mailed to a stratified sample of 9,250 persons  assigned to "increased"  to four assigned  to "elimi-
representing the U.S. population.  The questionnaire  nated."
was mailed three times with three reminder cards to  Some  states were  oversampled  to produce  state-
improve the response rate.  Bad addresses, deceased  level analyses.  For the national analysis used in this
respondents,  and  completed  questionnaires  repre-  paper, the data were weighted using national popu-
sent about 54 percent of the original sample.  Com-  lation censuses  and number of respondents  in the
pleted  questionnaires  were  available  from  3,212  different regions.  The statistical weighting proce-
respondents.  Because  of missing  observations  the  dure also counters  the differential  response by sex
number of questionnaires  used in the final analysis  and race (Sonquist and Dunkelberg).  Molnar  pro-
was 2,851.  vides a more detailed discussion on the development
The survey consisted of more than 150 questions  and administration of the questionnaire,  data proc-
about different farm issues and standardized  ques-  essing, weighting procedure, and response rate.
tions  to  obtain  socioeconomic  and  demographic
background data.  For this study, six statements  re-  Exploratory Analysis
lated to soil erosion and soil conservation were ana-  While soil erosion is the unifying concept under-
lyzed.  Table  1 summarizes the six statements  and  lying  the six statements,  the statements  differ  in
the corresponding responses.  For the first five state-  wording, focus, and context.  The six statements can
ments,  respondents  registered the intensity  of their  be classified into three sets depending  on the focus
responses  on  a five-category  Likert scale  ranging  of each statement.  The first two statements measure
from strongly agree to strongly disagree.  The sixth  the respondent's  awareness or perception of an ero-
statement related to partial payment for reducing soil  sion problem.  A respondent who agreed  with the
erosion with the responses ranging from partial pay-  first two statements did not perceive erosion to be a
ment  should  be  "increased"  to  partial  payment  problem,  while  one who disagreed  with the state-
should be "eliminated."  Numerical values were as-  ments  had a perception that erosion is a problem.
signed  to  the  responses.  Zero  was  assigned  to  Hence, the respondent's awareness or perception of
Table 1. Summary of Responses to Soil Erosion-Related Questions (n = 2,851)
Frequency and percent
Statement  S.A.a  -A.  U.  D.  S.D  Skewness  Kurtosis
1.Given the economic realities,  96  589  838  1071  257  0.247  -0.631
soil conservation  programs  (3)b  (21)  (29)  (38)  (9)
are carried too far.
2. Most farmers take good care  146  1571  742  360  32  -0.730  0.089
of the soil.  (5)  (55)  (26)  (13)  (1)
3. Farmers who do not adopt  160  1062  861  682  86  0.201  -0.728
the needed soil conservation  (6)  (37)  (30)  (24)  (3)
practices  should be fined.
4. Laws regulaitng excess soil  283  1339  945  249  35  0.436  0.156
erosion  are badly needed  (10)  (47)  (33)  (9)  (1)
5.  The  government should pay  126  868  743  975  139  -0.067  -0.933
farmers to practice soil con-  (4)  (30)  (26)  (34)  (5)
servation
Kept  Don't
Increased  same  Know  Decreased  Eliminated  Skewness  Kurtosis
6. Partial payments to farmers  864  976  502  217  292  0.805  -0.337
for the cost of reducing  ero-  (30)  (34)  (18)  (8)  (10)
sion should be -
aS.A. = Strongly Agree,  A. = Agree,  U.  = Undecided,  D.  = Disagree, S.D. =  Strongly Disagree.
bNumbers  in parenthesis represent percentages. Due to rounding error, percentages  may not add to  100.
74an erosion problem increases along the Likert scale.  Table 2.  Factor Analysis Results  after Varimax
While 47 percent disagreed ("disagreed" in this sec-  Rotation
tion  means  either  "strongly  disagreed"  or  "dis-
agreed") that soil conservation programs are carried  Statement No.  Factor 1  Factor  Factor
too far, only 14 percent disagreed that "farmers take  1  0.074  0.197  0.308*
good care of the soil."  2  -0.014  0.091  0.337*
Statements three and four relate to the support of  3  0.057  0.536*  0.177
laws that may lead to less soil erosion,  while state-  4  0.371  0.405*  0.203
ments five and six pertain to the support of govern-  5  0.696*  0.049  0.006
ment  payments  to  help  farmers  adopt  soil  0.680*  0.120  -0.003
conservation practices.  The support for laws and for
payments  decrease along the Likert scale.  Table  1  Common  55.999  26.371  14.380 variance percent shows  that  57  percent  of the  respondents  agreed
4C«  "„  . ^.  ^  -^  ««  i  °aThe statement numbers  correspond to those in Table 1. ("agree"  in  this  section  means  either  "strongly  Denotes the highest fcorloadng for  the ite  bl
agree"  or "agree")  that laws to regulate excess soil
erosion are badly needed.  A lesser percentage (43  number of factors)  (Bohmstedt).  Therefore,  three
percent)  of the respondents agreed that farmers who  factors were retained  and a varimax  rotation of the
do not adopt  soil conservation practices  should be  factors was implemented.  The three factors explain
fined.  An even smaller percentage  (35  percent) of  about 97 percent of the common variance.  Table 2
the respondents agreed  that the government should  shows these results.  The rotated factor pattern re-
pay  farmers  to  practice  soil  conservation  and  30  veals a structure that is identical to the hypothesized
percent stated  that the partial payments to farmers  construct structure.  This structure is shown by the
for the cost of reducing erosion should be increased.  highest loadings of each statement on the three fac-
The responses indicate more support for laws than  tors in Table 2.  Each factor is linked to two state-
for government payments.  ments related to one underlying concept.
The statements in Table 1 were hypothesized to be
linked  to  three  constructs  (factors).  Specifically,  Determinants of Perception and Preferences
statements  one  and two  were  hypothesized  to  be  The first  construct  (perception) measures  the re-
linked to a construct called "perception of an erosion  spondent's  perception of an erosion problem.  The
problem,"  henceforth  referred  to  as  "perception."  second (laws support)  and third (payments support)
Statements three and four were hypothesized to be  constructs  measure  public  preferences  for  certain
linked  to  a  construct  called  "laws  support,"  and  governmental policies.  The perceived benefits and
statements five  and six to  a construct called  "pay-  costs from a policy determine an individual's true
ments support."  These constructs are unobservable  preferences  (Lankford).  Because people form per-
and are referred to as latent factors.  Factor analysis  ceptions after collecting and processing information,
is one of the statistical procedures that involves the  perceptions will vary  across individuals depending
relationship between observed variables (statements  on their socioeconomic  and  demographic  charac-
1 to 6) and the underlying latent factors.  Exploratory  teristics.  These factors can also simultaneously in-
factor  analysis  has been  used to  help identify  the  fluence  individual  preferences.  Previous  studies
factors  that  underlie  a  set  of  observed  variables  have shown  the importance of factors  such as  in-
(Joreskog and Sorbom,  1979).  come, education,  sex,  age, political affiliation,  and
As  a  first  step,  a  principal  factor  analysis  was  location  of residence  in policy preferences  (Ferris
conducted on the correlation matrix of the responses  1983,  1985;  Hewitt; Schokkaert).  Table 3 presents
to the six statements of Table  1.  Results  indicated  the definitions and descriptive statistics of these and
that only three factors had eigenvalues  greater than  other variables expected to influence public percep-
the average of all eigenvalues  (Harman). These re-  tion of the soil erosion problem  and public prefer-
sults were supported by a maximum likelihood fac-  ences for conservation policies.
tor analysis of the response correlation matrix.  The
maximum likelihood  factor  analysis  rejected  one-  ECONOMETRIC  METHOD
factor and two-factor  models at the 5 percent level  Although  the  three  hypothesized  constructs  are
as  inadequate  with  X 2(9)  of 553.54  and  x2(4)  of  unobservable  (i.e. latent variables),  their effects on
20.05, respectively.  No more than three factors can  measurable (manifest) variables  are observable and
be extracted because the degrees of freedom will be  can be studied.  A class of models that handles this
exhausted (degrees of freedom = [(n-m)2 -(n+m)]/2,  type of variables is called latent variable models.  A
where n= number of observed variables and m is the  general  model that involves multiple indicators  of
75Table 3.  Definition  and Description of Variables Used  in Analysisa
Variable  name  Description  Mean
Income
INC  Midpoints of  nine income categories  ranging from less than $4,999 to  29586.1
$60,000 or moreb
Farm  income
FMINC  1 if respondents' family has income from farming, 0 otherwise  0.085
Age
AGE  Age in years  45.85
Employment  status (excluding category: employed full-time, employed part-time,  student, or homemaker)
UNEMPLOY  1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise  0.037
RETIRED  1  if retired  or disabled, 0 otherwise  0.222
Sex
FEMALE  1 if female, 0 otherwise  0.538
Race (excluded category: white)
BLACK  1 if black,  0 otherwise  0.146
OTHER  1 if not black or white, 0 otherwise  0.024
Agricultural education
AGEDN  1 if took high  school or college agricultural  course, 0 otherwise  0.156
Education  (excluded category: less than high school or some high school)
HSGRAD  1 if high school  graduate, 0 otherwise  0.240
SOMECOLL  1 if had  some college, 0 otherwise  0.299
COLLGRAD  1 if college graduate, 0 otherwise  0.226
POSTGRAD  1 if completed postgraduate  degree, 0 otherwise  0.112
Political affiliation  (excludied category: Republican)
DEMOCRAT  1 if Democrat, 0 otherwise  0.374
INDEP  1 if Independent, 0 otherwise  0.361
Place of residence (excluded category: farm or ranch)
LARCITY  1  if over 500,000 in population, 0 otherwise  0.222
MEDCITY  1 if between 50,000 and 500,000 in population, 0 otherwise  0.223
SMACITY  1 if between 10,000 and 50,000 in population, 0 otherwise  0.174
TOWN  1  if under 10,000 population, 0 otherwise  0.144
COUNTRY  1 if outside of town not on a farm, 0 otherwise  0.120
Region  (excluded category: Midwest)
NEAST  1 if from  Northeast, 0  otherwise  0.212
SOUTH  1 if from  South, 0 otherwise  0.340
WEST  1 if from West,  0 otherwise  0.201
aMeans are weighted  averages based on  2851 complete observations (see text). The standard deviations for the
continuous variables INC and AGE are 17449.1  and 15.45, respectively.
bValues for the lower and upper open-ended categories were calculated using the range between  midpoints of
succeeding and preceding categories,  respectively.
unobservable variables is  the linear structural rela-  mathematicalformulationconsiderthe  linearstruc-
tionships  (LISREL) model. It is used in this study  tural simultaneous equation model:
(Joreskog and Sorbom  1985,  1986,  1989).
The  LISREL model  consists  of two  parts,  the 
measurement  model  and  the  structural  equation
model.  The former specifies how the unobservable
(latent)  variables  relate  to  the  observed  variables  where  ' = (  ) arethe  dependent and  '=(l,
(manifest or indicators), while the latter specifies the  ...,  M)  the independent latent variables, and  ' = (i,
relationships  among  the latent  variables.  For  the  ... ,(L)  is a vector of residuals representing both errors
76in equations  and random disturbance  terms.  The
matrices  B  (LxL)  and  r(LxM)  are  regression  (7)  yx
weights to be estimated.  The two vectors  of latent  ti ]
variables are related to two vectors of indicators byy  xx
(2)  y =Ay q  + e  and  The above LISREL model can be estimated by full
(3)  x =A,  4 + 6  information maximum likelihood (FIML) by fitting
I  to the observed covariance  matrix,  S,  of y and x
where  y'  =  (y,  ...,  y)  and  x'  (xl,...,  x)  are  (Joreskog  and  Sorbom  1985,  1986).  The  FIML where  y'  = (yi,  ...,  yq)  and  x'  - (xi,  ...,  xp)  are  .
mean-centered  and considered  indicators of the de-  method gives consistent  and efficient estimates of
pendent and independent latent variables.  The vec-  the model's parameters  B,  r,  A,  Ax,  vA  ,  e.,  and
tors e and 6 represent errors of measurement in y and  0^. Assumptions and hypothesized relations between
x.  The unknown matrices Ay  (qxL) and A,  (PxM)  variables  can  be  specified  as  restrictions  on  the
model's parameters.
contain regression weights  of y  on rl  and  x  on  g, 
co i  rtivegsi.  T  loweig  n  a  ion wr  The model used in this study is a special case of respectively.  The  following  assumptions  were
e:.  o  the above LISREL model.  In particular,  it was  as-
sumed that the explanatory variables are fixed.  That
(a) E()  = E()  = E(6) =  is,  andhence is, x = ~, and hence
(b)  e is uncorrelated with q, 6 is uncorrelated with
',  1 is uncorrelated with t, and r, e, and 6 are  = I,  0o = O, E[xx'] =  ,
mutually uncorrelated.
(c) B* = (I - B)'-  where (I -B) is non-singular.  where  s an identity matrix of appropate dimen-
The different variance-covariance  matrices are de-  sion
fined below:  Imposing the restrictions implied by the relation-
ships between  the indicators  (y-variables) and the
E[t'] = ·'  (MxM)  three constructs allows us to write A'y in the follow-
E[?]']  =  1  (LxL)  ing form:
E[ee']  = 0e (qxq), and
21B']  =  0, (qxq), and  X  21 0  0  0  0
E[56']  = Oe  (pxp).  (8)  Ay'=O  0  X 32 X 42 0
O  0  0  0  X 53 X 63
Given equations  (1)  to (3)  and the above assump-
tions, the predicted covariance matrix of the x vari-  While B is assumed to have the form:
ables,  xx,  is given by
[0  0  01
(4)  ,xx=Ax D A'x +0  . (9)  B=IB21  0  01
LB 31 B 32 0j
Similarly, the predicted covariance matrices  for yi  i  i-'~  . ~~~Equation  (1), which can now be rewritten as and for yx are given by
(5)  yy = AyB*(rFFr+  1) B*'A'y +0,  and  (10)  = B+  x +
is thus a recursive system of simultaneous equations.
For model identification and  to ease interpretation,
(6)  yx = AyB rA'x . the scales of the construct were  fixed according to
the restrictions:  Xl,  =  1, X 32 =  63  =  -1 while T  is
Hence,  the predicted covariance matrix of the ob-  assumed  to  be a  diagonal  matrix.'  No restrictions
served variables, £, is given by  were imposed on F and OE.
1  Given the numerical values assigned  to the responses,  perception increases, while law and payment supports decrease along the
Likert scale.  The  restrictions X 1i=l, X 32=X63=-1 , therefore, were imposed to retrieve the definitions of the construct variables.
77EMPIRICAL RESULTS  Table 4.  Estimate  of Construct  Loading and Model
Full information maximum likelihood was used to  Goodness-of-Fit Statistics
estimate the free parameters of the model (Joreskog  Parameter  Estimate  Asymptotic t
and  Sorbom  1989).2  Tables  4  - 5 present the pa-  1  OOOa
rameter  estimates and goodness-of-fit  statistics for
the model.  X21  0.834*  -13.009
As shown inTable 4, the measurement structure fits  X32  -1.OOOa 
well.  All  estimates  of  the  construct  loadings  are  M42  -1.609*  -15.839
statistically significant at the 1 percent level and the  53  -1.061  -22.165
measurement R 2 is high, 0.907.  Other goodness-of-
fit statistics  include  the  structural  R2 (0.548),  the  3  -1.00a
adjusted  goodness-of-fit  index  (0.936),  and  root  Number  of observations = 2,851
mean squared residual  (0.020).  Moreover,  a simul-  Measurement  R 2 =  0.907
taneous test of all the x-variables  (see equation  10)  Structural  R 2= 0.548
in the full model (FM) against the null model (NM)  Goodness-of-fit  index = 0989 Goodness-of-fit  index = 0.989
was conducted.  The NM restricts all coefficients on
the x-variables  equal to zero.  The results show that  Adjustment goodness-of-fit  index =  0.936
these variables jointly have significant explanatory  Root mean squared  residual = 0.020
power as shown by a X2(NM-FM),  with 69 degrees  x2 for full  model with 75 degrees of freedom =  468.64
of freedom, of 460.03.  x2 for null model with 156 degrees of freedom = 928.67b
Table  5  shows  the estimated  coefficients  of ex-  a CTable  5 shows  the est  d cs  of  e-  Construct loading is restricted for model identification
planatory  variables and their associated asymptotic  (see footnote 1).
t-statistics.3 These coefficients  represent the direct  bThe null model is  obtained  by restricting  all elements in
impact  of the  explanatory  variables  on  the three  r equal to zero.
constructs:  perception of an erosion problem (per-  Significant at the 1 percent  level.
ception), laws support, and payments support.4 Due
to the lack of a theoretical foundation,  no a priori  tion.  All the residence variables except TOWN, had
hypotheses were formulated  about the direction of  positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficients,
effects  of the explanatory  variables  on perception  concerning perceptions  of an erosion problem (rl).
(r  1).  The result indicates that people living outside a farm
Age, education, political affiliation, place of resi-  or ranch had a higher perception than those living on
dence,  and  region  were  found  to  be  statistically  a farm or ranch.  Concerning region, residing in the
significant  factors  that  influence the perception of  South or West had about an equal impact on percep-
erosion.  Age had a negative  effect on  perception,  tion,  but  higher  than the  impact  of the  Midwest.
while  education's effect  was positive.  The aware-  Respondents from the Northeast exhibited the high-
ness or perception increased with the level of educa-  est perception.
tion, as  shown by the increasing  coefficient  on the  Table  5 also  shows  that age,  employment  status
education variables.  Also, respondents  who took a  (RETIRED), race (BLACK), education, political af-
high school or technical college course in agriculture  filiation (INDEP), and perception (q l)  were impor-
had a higher perception of the erosion problem than  tant factors  that  influence respondent's  support  of
those who  did not.  Other studies have shown that  laws  to  encourage  soil  conservation.  Significant
younger  and  highly-educated  respondents  were  factors that  influence support for payments  by the
more concerned about environmental problems than  government included farm income, age, sex, agricul-
their counterparts (Hamilton  1985a,b).  Democrats  tural education,  political  affiliation,  place  of resi-
and Independents had higher perceptions relative to  dence  (SMACITY and TOWN), region (SOUTH),
Republicans.  Independents had the highest percep-  perception (ql), and support for laws  (r12).  The co-
2Full information maximum likelihood estimation and inference assumes that the ys are independently and multivariate
normally distributed given x. Univariate skewness and kurtosis within the range -1.0 to +1.0  (see Table 1)  indicate that maximum
likelihood results would be robust (Bentler and Chou; Muthen and Kaplan).
3The analysis was based than on the polychoric correlation matrix rather than the covariance matrix,  E, (Babakus et al.).  The
coefficient  estimates, therefore,  are standardized  and can be compared across variables (Saris and Stronkhorst).
4Because of the recursive nature of the model  (see equation  10), the explanatory variables will have both direct and indirect
effects on the dependent variables.  The total effect is the sum of these two effects.  Since B12 =  B13 = 0 (see equation 9), the
x-variables will have only direct effects on ri.
78Table 5. Coefficient  Estimates of Explanatory Variables and Asymptotic t-Statisticsa
1llb  q2  113
Variable  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t  Coeff.  t
INC  -0.01676  -0.955  -0.00927  -0.535  -0.01458  -0.646
FMINC  0.01002  0.629  0.00139  0.088  0.05727**  2.799
AGE  -0.04627**  -2.242  0.05971**  2.825  -0.14677**  -4.086
UMEMPLOY  -0.00616  -0.403  0.01810  1.203  0.02822  1.367
RETIRED  -0.02086  -1.001  0.03618*  1.751  -0.03012  -1.001
FEMALE  -0.00386  -0.245  0.02060  1.330  0.03933*  1.836
BLACK  0.00993  0.632  -0.02983*  -1.917  0.02380  1.041
OTHER  -0.00557  -0.365  -0.00184  -0.123  0.01085  0.555
AGEDN  0.03414**  2.107  -0.01904  -1.162  0.04643**  2.030
HSGRAD  0.01179  0.510  -0.01552  -0.683  0.00363  0.120
SOMECOLL  0.10208**  4.182  -0.08087**  3.012  0.04529  0.945
COLLGRAD  0.15065**  6.077  -0.1 1783**  -3.904  0.06621  1.069
POSTGRAD  0.16195**  7.340  -0.12037**  -4.169  0.08986  1.451
DEMOCRAT  0.04692**  2.508  0.00863  0.452  0.09964**  4.088
INDEP  0.07824**  4.277  -0.04159**  -2.071  0.05726*  1.809
LARCITY  0.04905**  2.191  -0.02147  -0.947  -0.02153  -0.694
MEDCITY  0.06204**  2.648  -0.02604  -1.083  -0.04562  -1.355
SMCITY  0.04127*  1.857  -0.00912  -0.409  -0.04876*  -1.660
TOWN  0.01986  0.942  -0.00420  -0.202  -0.08544**  -3.129
COUNTRY  0.03797*  1.823  -0.02609  1.247  -0.02051  -0.699
SOUTH  0.03125*  1.677  -0.00854  -0.459  -0.04048*  -1.645
WEST  0.03264*  1.890  -0.02382  -1.371  -0.01425  -0.578
NEAST  0.05567**  3.237  -0.00593  -0.330  0.01898  0.811
11  - - 0.92815**  7.140  -0.77583*  -1.917
12  - - -.  ..-  _____-  1.406  411.41066**  4.419
"Single  and double asterisks denote significance at the 10 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
b11,  12, and 113  denote "perception of an  erosion problem'  "laws support," and "payments support," respectively.
efficients on these variables, however, represent only  ployed, student,  and home-maker;  and among  fe-
the direct impact of the explanatory variables on f2  males  than males.  Democrats  and  Independents
and 13.  showed a higher support for laws to encourage  soil
conservation  than  Republicans,  while blacks  and To determine the total impact of the explanatory  c  t  R 
other races  had less  support for laws  than whites.
variables on laws support (q2) and payments support  Resoets  m the sother,  western, and north- Respondents  from the southern, western, and north-
(rq), the indirect effects of these variables on r2 and  eastern regions exhibited a higher support for laws
n3  were calculated  and added to the direct effects.s  than did those from the Midwest with such support
Table 6 presents those results.  With few exceptions  reaching its maximum in the Northeast.  Perception
(income,  black,  other,  high  school  graduates),  all  of soil erosion as a problem proved to be an impor-
variables had a positive total effect on laws support  tant factor that positively influenced laws support.
(r2).  Support  for laws  increased  as age,  level  of  The  payments-support  construct  represents  the
education,  and  level  of urbanization  increased.  preference of respondents for government support to
There  was  a stronger preference  for  laws  support  farmers.  It is possible that  some  respondents  ex-
among  unemployed  and  retired  than  among  em-  pected the financing of such a policy to be from taxes
5  12  = B 21 11 1 +  F2x;  113  = B 31 q11  +  B 32 12 +  F 3x;  r2j and r3jare  the direct impacts of the jth variable  on 112  and q3 respectively
(Table 5), while B 21 (0rq  / dxj)  = (B 21r 1j) and B31slj +  B 32 (B 21 Flj +  F2j)  are the indirect impacts of the jh  variable on r2 and 113,
respectively.  The total impact is the sum of the direct and indirect impacts.
79Table 6.  Indirect and Total  Effects  of Explanatory  negative total impacts  on r3.  In light of the self-in-
Variables  on the Constructs  terest model, this result was expected because these
Laws support  Payment support  dummy residence-variables  contrast consumers and
q2  q3  producers (farm residence is the excluded category)
and hence have a private benefit interpretation.  The Indirect  Total  Indirect  Total
Variable  effect  effect  effect  effect  preference  for  payment  support  was  stronger  for
females  than males  and  for  Democrats  and Inde- INC  -0.01556  -0.02483  0.02202  -0.03660 pendents than Republicans.  The negative total im-
FMINC  0.00930  0.01069  0.00730  0.06458 .0  0.  . pact of AGE on r3 shows that older individuals were
AGE  -0.04295  0.01676  0.05954  -0.08722  more likely  to disapprove of policies that increase
UMEMPLOY  -0.00571  0.01238  0.02224  0.05047  payments  to farmers  to practice  soil conservation.
RETIRED  -0.01936  0.01682  0.03991  0.00979  While respondents  from the South  and West were
FEMALE  -0.00358  0.01702  0.02700  0.06633  less  supportive  of a  government  payment-support
BLACK  0.00922  -0.02061  -0.03678  -0.01297  policy  than those  from  the Midwest,  respondents
OTHER  -0.00517  -0.00701  -0.00557  0.00528  from the Northeast were more supportive of such a
AGEDN  0.03168  0.01265  -0.00864  0.03779  p  l 
Although  it had a positive total effect on payment
HSGRAD  0.01094  -0.00457  -0.01560  -0.01197 -0.01  support, perception  of an erosion problem  (qll)  had
SOMECOLL  0.09475  0.01388  -0.05962  -0.01433  a negative  direct effect  on payment  support.  Only
COLLGRAD  0.13983  0.02200  -0.08584  -0.01963  through laws support was the total effect of percep-
POSTGRAD  0.15032  0.02994  -0.08341  0.00645  tion on payments support positive.  This result indi-
DEMOCRAT  0.04355  0.05217  0.03720  0.13684  cates that although people might perceive erosion as
INDEP  0.07262  0.03104  -0.01692  0.04034  a problem, they were not willing to support govern-
LARCITY  0.04552  0.02405  -0.00413  -0.02565  ment's payments to farmers in the absence  of laws
MEDCITY  0.05758  0.03155  -0.00363  -0.04889  enforcement.  Moreover,  the total effect of percep- MEDCITY  0.05758  0.03155  -0.00363  -0.04889
tion (rl ) on payments support was less than the total SMCITY  0.03830  0.02918  0.00915  -0.03962
effect of rll on laws support. The result indicates that
TOWN  0.01844  0.01423  0.00467  -0.08077 as people perceived soil erosion as more problem-
COUNTRY  0.03524  0.00915  -0.01654  -0.03706  atic, they had stronger preferences for laws than for
SOUTH  0.02900  0.02046  0.00462  -0.03587  government payments.  Laws support (12)  also had
WEST  0.03029  0.00647  -0.01619  -0.03044  a positive total effect on payments support showing
NEAST  0.05167  0.04573  0.02133  0.04031  that a payment support policy cannot be a substitute
q1  0.00000  0.92815  1.30930  0.53347  for laws.  Laws and payments  supports were thus
__2  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  1.41066  considered to be complementary rather than substi-
tute policies.
on income.  In this  context,  there  is  considerable
empirical  evidence in the literature that individual  CONCLUSIONS
policy preferences reflect self-interest (Deacon and  In this study,  data  from  a nationwide  survey  of
Shapiro; Fisher; Hewitt).  A pure self-interest model,  people concerning  their attitudes toward agriculture
therefore,  implies a negative  effect  for  income  on  were used to estimate the structure of respondents'
payment support.  The results show that income had  preferences for government soil erosion control pro-
both negative indirect  and total effects  on payment  grams. Because the response to a single question can
support.  Support of payments also decreased as the  be sensitive to the wording and position of a question
level  of education increased.  Highly-educated  re-  in  the  questionnaire,  responses  to  multiple  state-
spondents  were likely to perceive government pay-  ments  were  analyzed  within  the  linear  structural
ment support  to  be financed by more  taxes.  The  relationship  (LISREL) framework.  This approach
private benefit variable FMINC (indicating whether  helps control for the measurement error in responses
a respondent's family has farm income) had a posi-  and estimates  the impact of socio-economic,  demo-
tive total effect  on payment support.  The sign was  graphic,  and political variables hypothesized to in-
expected  because  the variable  (FMINC)  identifies  fluence citizen perceptions and preferences.
the potential  beneficiaries  of the policy.  Although  The results  showed that  age, education,  political
only  two  residence-variables  (SMACITY  and  affiliation, place of residence, and region had signifi-
TOWN)  were significant in explaining variations in  cant impacts on citizen perception or awareness  of
payment  support  (q3),  all  residence  variables  had  an erosion problem.  This perception increased with
80the level of education and decreased  with age,  im-  support for payments was positively influenced  by
plying  the importance  of educational  programs  in  support for laws.  This result indicates that respon-
raising public awareness about environmental prob-  dents considered laws and government payments to
lems.  Results  showed  that respondents  from the  be complementary rather than substitute policies.
South and West have higher perceptions of the prob-  An important policy issue arises from the results
lem of soil  erosion  than those from  the Midwest,  of this study concerning  how agriculture deals with
while perception  was at its maximum for  respon-  environmental  issues.  The respondents'  preference
dents from the Northeast.  for the use of laws over payments to force farmers to
The government policies considered in this study  address erosion problems  points to a possible shift
were laws and financial payments support to encour-  in  government  policy.  Historically,  programs  to
age soil  conservation.  Respondents  acted in their  change  farmer  behavior  have  relied  on  voluntary
self-interest in deciding their preferences for govern-  incentive programs.  On the other hand, programs to
ment payment-support policy in agriculture.  These  address pollution in other industries have generally
results hold even though soil erosion is a well recog-  relied on command and control regulation.  As the
nized environmental problem.  The results may also  effect of agriculture  on the environment  becomes a
indicate that respondents felt that soil conservation  topic of concern in the policy arena, farmers may be
is a farmer's responsibility.  faced  with command  and control laws  rather  than
The study also showed  that the perception of an  incentive or payment programs.  Although the non-
erosion problem was a significant factor that influ-  point nature  of much of agriculture's  effect on the
enced preferences  for government  policies. As  re-  environment makes traditional environmental  regu-
spondents  became  more  aware  of erosion,  they  lation difficult, the erosion example may foreshadow
exhibited  more  support  for  conservation  policies.  efforts  by  policy  makers  to  enforce  programs
Respondents, however, tended to have more support  through  laws rather than through  compliance pro-
for  laws  than  for  government  payments  to  force  grams.
farmers  to  adopt soil  conservation  practices.  The
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